The despatches of Col. Stakhovitch of the Russian General Staff attached to the British military forces in South-Africa

Oct. 27th. 1899

The officers, appointed to accompany English troops are: From France Major d'Amade, from Germany the resident Attache Militaire here, from the U.S.A. - their military attache in Portugal and myself. We are all leaving on Saturday, November 6th . . . together with a squadron of the Scots Greys - the regiment of His Majesty Our Emperor. We will be accompanied everywhere and placed under the charge of Colonel Herbert the former English Military Attache in St.Petersburg.

The English government has kindly given us the opportunity to purchase a horse each at the local price paid by the army. We are also given an orderly each and both they and the horses (the second horse we will buy on the spot) are to be kept at the State's expense.

Many small favours are bestowed upon us but I fear that we will be deprived of the most essential - the possibility of seeing military operations at closehand. It looks as if we are going to be kept in the distance. That is, naturally, very unpleasant.

In conclusion I consider it imperative to mention that public opinion and the press here are awaiting, with an extraordinary nervousness, hostile and decisive actions both from us and France. The Persian Gulf is indicated as 'n possible locality for future developments'

That is the only explanation for the start of mobilisation of the reserve squadron here.

Nov. 6th. {1899}

I do not consider it possible to inform you about current events on the theatre of military operations - mainly because in London, less than anywhere else, is one m the position to gather correct information concerning the war.

The whole of the press, including the liberal and the radical organs, wholeheartedly supports the government in its desire to hide the truth. The opposition press attacks the government, (in quite a sharp manner) for the very fact of the war and the insufficient state of preparedness as for criticism of military operations, that is very limited on account of the lack of factual material, because all information coming from the theatre of war is subject to most stringent censorship. Serious protests have been made lately against this restricting measure.

Public opinion in England is very much more upset by the latest failures in Natal, than would appear from the newspapers.

Nov. 14th on board the "Bavarian"'

The boat is roomy and excellently appointed. One half of it is given to one battalion and a company of medical orderlies - the other to the second battalion and a company of sappers.

Each half of the ship has its own kitchen. Although these are very small 12 by 15 square arshins' food is prepared for 1 200 men in each of them. Order and cleanliness in these kitchens are quite exemplar. It is worth drawing attention to the depth of the cooking pots, which are up to 24 arshins' deep. The stores and refrigerators are arranged in a most practical way, so that the overall impression is that not even a tiny corner is wasted in this huge ship. Everything is put to good use ...

The discipline on board is excellent. The relations between the lower ranks and the officers are very simple and natural. Men have the freedom to go about as they like even on the officers' deck and do not abuse the privilege.

Nov. 26th

The Lee-Metford rifle is unsatisfactory from the point of view of loading. Cartridges are put in one by one, slowly, and often get jammed which slows down the operation even more.

Dec. 11th. Cape Town

Yesterday on Dec. 10th (new style) we arrived in Cape Town. From the newspapers we learnt that General Buller is in Natal, and because of that we insistently asked Col. Herbert to arrange that permission should be given to us to proceed there. However, he soon informed us that our request cannot be satisfied under any circumstances and that we must await General Buller's return in Cape Town, as he has gone to Natal without his General Staff but only with his personal secretary and Aide de Camp and will be back here shortly. All our protests and our efforts of persuasion were of no avail.

Rooms at the best hotel here, in no way inferior to the best hotels in Europe, but considerably superior to them in the amount charged by them were prepared for us in Cape Town.

Today we made a few necessary calls, signed our names in the guest book of the Governor, (Sir Alfred Milner) on whose behalf we had already yesterday received invitations to dinner this evening.

In spite of the rumour that 2 300 Hollanders have joined the Transvaal forces, and of the difficult situation because of the tenacious resistance offered by the Boers, the English have maintained absolute calm, and their former unshakable assurance in victory.

The second impression, which has struck me is the light effect produced by the small caliber Mauser bullets. The wounds from them are not serious on the whole. I met several officers, wounded 8 days ago who had already recovered sufficiently to join the ranks again. This fact has been confirmed by every person I have spoken to.

Dec. 5th

My first week's stay has not been satisfactory from the point of view of my mission here. From morning till night we (that is the Military Attaches) are forced to make official and sometimes unofficial calls, participate in dinner functions given in our honour, reciprocate them, make excursions and give little time to military occupations and even when we do see what we are shown rather than what we would like to see. In one word, we are made to feel that we are wanted, but they do not want to show us what matters most to us.

I doubt if our governments will be particularly pleased to hear that we are just enjoying life here instead of attending to the task for which we were dispatched.

Now (at midnight) we have just been told that we will probably go to see the battlefield of the Modder River.

[On the way they visit a prison where Boer Prisoners of War are kept]

The upkeep of prisoners, from the point of view of air, surroundings and food, is quite remarkable-luxurious one might say. I attribute this treatment, not to the magnanimity of the English, but to political considerations; the desire (with view to the future) to dispose Boer public opinion in their favour.

The prisoners of war behave with great dignity.

Dec. 9th

The proposed trip to De Aar never materialised.

We received the following reply to our enquiry (concerning this matter) from General Buller:" "I have agreed to the Military Attaches taking part in the forthcoming general advance of the army, but cannot allow them to follow isolated flying columns."

When the English Government agreed to allow me to be attached to English forces, it was stated that I was receiving permission to watch the operations of English forces in South Africa. There was no indication made then as to the kind of operations - defensive or offensive ones. When starting the war, a government cannot state with certainty, in advance, whether a war will be defensive or offensive; so it might happen that allowing Military Attaches to be with the forces only during offensive actions, they might be deprived of the chance of seeing anything at all. The question of officers attached to the fighting sides, and of their rights, should, it seems, be based on international precedent. As far as is known to me our government gave foreign Military Attaches great freedom during the last Russo-Turkish Campaign (1877-78)," allowing them to attach themselves to and follow detachments of any size. On account of that I consider that I am entitled to expect similar treatment.

Colonel Herbert has told me that he had asked the Commander-m-Chief's permission to charge all our living expenses in Cape Town to the English government, because of our having to stay here longer than was anticipated to begin with and the cost of living is very high . .. This is a very strange proposition, it looks as we are offered board and lodging at a luxurious hotel, as a compensation for not being allowed to join the troops. I replied with a categoric refusal, adding that the question of costs does not arise for me, as my government having foreseen all eventualities, has amply provided me with material means.

Dec. 9th

Generally speaking, the position of the English army on the theatre of military operations does not appear to be favourable. One feels (as one cannot know for sure, seeing that everything is concealed) that things are going badly.

Dec. 17th

[After seeing Port Elizabeth on the way to Durban the author was told about the mule depot which he did not have time to see himself].

There were more than 4 000 mules, which were kept and given exercise here after arriving in S.A. The mules brought here from Italy, Spain and America, turned out to be very wild, particularly the American ones. Many of them ran away. Notices were put up that all hooved and branded mules are the property of the government and must be returned accordingly.

Dec. 18th. From Marizburg

We hoped to proceed immediately to the Chieveley camp, but nothing doing. First stop was made under the pretext to get us some horses as ours were left behind in Cape Town. When that question had been settled, we were told of the following telegram from General Buller: "Categorically refuse foreign officers to remain in camp, on account of the lack of water and of the necessary comforts permit them to come and inspect the camp for the duration of twenty-four hours only."

Our collective protest, pointing out that we needed no comforts and that 8 persons do not use much water, remained unanswered.

It is clear that General Buller stubbornly does not wish to allow us to see anything at close range.

If I do not succeed in seeing what I must and would like to see, I intend having a few serious words again with Colonel Herbert, I wish to inform him that my Government has sent me here as an observer of military operations - whereas I do not even see any troops and their life in the field. If this continues in the same fashion, I will be forced to suggest to my superiors to recall me since my remaining here under the present circumstances is quite futile.

They did show us a few things in Pietermaritzburg (entertaining us as if we were children). We saw a hospital (excellently appointed), were present at a review (not a genuine one, but a put up job) of a volunteer company of mounted infantry, and we inspected the main base military camp. But most of our time is spent in endless calls, dinners and lunches given in our honour and which we must reciprocate. All that is so dull that I do not consider it worthwhile describing.

All the English are full of admiration at the activity of the Boers and say that they have made remarkable use of defense. I consider this activity unsatisfactory. Admitting, that for many reasons, they cannot carry out offensive operations; one must not forget either that positive results cannot be achieved with passive actions only. As it is they who began the war, they should take the risk of more decisive, active steps (if only against communication lines). They should have taken better and fuller advantage of their superiority of numbers and the unpreparedness of the enemy at the outstart. Now time has already been lost (or almost lost).

January 2nd 1900. Estcourt

Having been promised by General Buller that we would be notified in advance of any forthcoming battle, we were sure that we would have the opportunity to be present at the second attempt of forcing the Tugela.~ However, our hopes were not justified.

Jan. 9th

The Fifth Division moved forward to Frere. We asked to be allowed to follow it. Colonel Herbert went to see General Buller and, having returned from him, brought us the following message: this is only an outflanking movement which is proposed now in which General Buller will not allow us to take part under any pretext, but should there be a frontal attack at Colenzo, we will be told in time.

Jan. 10th

We have just heard about the movement of the forces in the direction of Springfield,zs and this morning we were told that General Buller has undertaken an outflanking movement with all his forces (five infantry brigades, 58 guns. . . about 20 thousand men in all) against the right flank: of the Boer positions, leaving only 2 batteries with four guns at the Chieveley and I ~batteries with two guns at the Frere amps.""

It is clear that nothing can be undertaken with the remaining forces at Colenso. Therefore we will again see nothing.

I considered it my duty to have another explanation with Colonel Herbert and tried to prove to him that military attaches have the right to take part in such an important operation as the advance towards Springfield, that our presence would in no way impede military operations, that we would only take the things which could be fixed to our saddles and that it is humiliating for an officer, accredited by his government to watch all military operations, to find himself some 30 versts"" away from the general battle, in the rear, when newspaper correspondents are allowed to follow the troops anywhere.

When Colonel Herbert told me that the decision of General Buller was inflexible, I requested him to send me a written confirmation of this, which I could at least send on to my Government, as a proof that I had done everything in my power in order to fulfil the mission with which I had been entrusted.

I feel it my duty to add that all this has in no way affected my relations with Colonel Herbert; they have remained very friendly. Colonel Herbert is doing all he can to get us out of our present strange predicament, but on account of General Buller's obstinacy, has not achieved much.

General Buller issued the following order today (dated January 9th, 1900) at Estcourt, signed by Colonel Herbert: The Commander-in-Chief wishes to give the Military Attaches the opportunity of watching action along the main communication line and will offer them all the facilities for doing so, but in the case of auxilliary operations cannot allow them to take part, and cannot assume the responsibility for the security of their supplies. In making this decision the Commander-in-Chief is acting according to precedent adopted by European armies."